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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses Estonian economic developments during the first decade of 21
st 
century. Estonia provided in that period a clear-cut example of the classical business 
cycle  with  an  extreme  bubble-burst  sequence  of  economic  activities.  The  author 
analyses  the  reasons  on  such  a  volatile  economic  growth  pattern  and  explains 
economic  cycle  management  particularities  in  Estonia.  In  the  frames  of 
macroeconomic developments will be analyzed monetary and fiscal policies. The 
author argues, that Estonia’s fiscal policy has been always pro-cyclical, what has 
deepened country’s macroeconomic volatility. The paper also analyses critically the 
government activities and policies during the recent crisis.  
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“If it is crisis, in such a crises I’d like 
to live”, Mr. Andrus Ansip, Estonian 
Prime Minister, December 2007
1 
 
1. General 
 
Estonia provided during the last decade a clear-cut example of a classical business 
cycle with an extreme bubble-burst sequence of economic activities
2. Rather similar 
patterns of economic developments can also be observed also in the neighboring 
Baltic countries
3. 
 
At the turn of the century, the Baltic countries recovered from the Asian and Russian 
crises and continued the accession process with the European Union. Until the 
global  recession,  which  started  in  2008,  the  Baltic  countries  demonstrated 
exceptionally high growth rates and fast increases of living standards. However, in 
the global economic downturn, the Baltic countries suffered dramatic and substantial 
GDP  declines.  As  put  by  the  Mrs.  Solvita  Aboltina,  Speaker  of  the  Latvian 
parliament, the Saeima – “we found ourselves in a deep crisis as a result of ignoring 
the basic laws of  economics and following thoughtless politics” (Aboltina 2011, 
p.1.). Therefore one can ask – what went wrong in Estonia and the other Baltic 
                                                                  
1 Estonian PM denies any crises and economic downturn possibilities even very clear warning 
signals 
2 Comprehensive overview of business cycles is given by Knoop (2010) 
3 The Baltic countries here and thereafter are defined as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.   261 
countries and what were the reasons for such considerable economic fluctuations? 
Was such a shocking situation avoidable? 
 
Rather often in Estonia is presented a narrative, that small and open economies like 
hers could do nothing to prevent the impact of outside economic shocks and that 
there are no possibilities to stabilize the economy during a worldwide financial and 
economic recession. In such a situation they are left alone in the global turbulence 
and their fate depends completely on outside developments. Somehow that is a very 
comfortable  position  for  the  Estonian  ruling  political  coalition,  as  it  allows 
rechanneling the responsibility for the crisis to force majeure circumstances. True, 
Estonia  is  the  second  smallest  economy  in  the  European  Union  after  Malta. 
Therefore,  its  economic  volatility  is  rather  high  and  its  susceptibility  to  outside 
shocks is considerable. 
 
However, the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate, that the economic crisis in 
Estonia has its own built-in causes and that the global crises only deepened the 
harshness of the situation. Another rationale for the paper is to explain Estonian 
macroeconomic policy options and to critically evaluate the policy choices made 
during the boom and bust periods. 
 
It is the author understands that comprehensive studies of the economic cycle and its 
management in Estonia during the last decade are still missing
4. There are many 
studies, analyzing different aspects of economic developments, but rather often 
those are concentrating on a certain phase or aspect of the business cycle (e.g. 
Purfield and Rosenberg 20 10). As a result, analysis of the full -scale Estonian 
business cycle is somewhat fragmented. The current paper closely connects different 
phases of the business cycle. There is a clear link between the recession and 
mistakes in macroeconomic policy, which allowed the economy to overheat and to 
accumulate enormous imbalances during the earlier boom years. 
 
The author shares the understanding, that the main reason for  Estonia’s crisis is 
related  to  unbalanced  growth  during  the  years  2004-2008.  Those  years  laid  the 
foundation for the deformation of the economic structure and decreased its strength 
to  compete  globally.  The  economic  bubble  in  certain  sectors  –  primarily  in 
construction, retailing and related industries - generated the situation; the downside 
correction  was  inevitable.  Therefore,  the  Estonian  and  Baltic  recession  is 
undoubtedly related to the economic policies and the “state of affairs” during earlier 
boom years. 
 
The first part of the paper gives the indicators which demonstrate the foundations for 
the “bubble” and economic overheating in Estonia. The second part of the paper 
generalizes  macroeconomic  policy  and  business  cycle  management  in  Estonia 
during  the  crises  years  2008-2010.  Since  the  paper’s  scope  is  limited,  not  all 
presented statistical date will be equally explained. 
                                                                  
4  Excellent  study  about  Latvian  economic  cycle  management  is  provided  by  Åslund  and 
Dombrovskis (2011).   
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2. Cooking the economic bubble in Estonia 
 
This section of the paper characterizes the Estonian growth period, which ends with 
sharp contraction of economic activities in 2008. During the decade, until the crises, 
Estonia  and  the  other  Baltic  countries  made  considerable  progress  in  economic 
development and noticeably improved their living standards. Table 1 presents GDP 
per capita developments in the Baltic-Nordic and the European Union membership 
countries growth figures. The Nordic countries include Finland, Sweden, Denmark 
and  Norway.  The  figures  at  this  point  and  hereinafter  are  calculated  as  average 
figures of those countries. The EU 27 countries average figures are received from 
the Eurostat statistical portal.  
 
Estonian  GDP  level  per  capita  increased  during  the  decade  considerably.  The 
highest level on average GDP level was reached in 2008 - just on the eve of the 
crisis. In that year, the GDP level per capita was 171% higher than at the beginning 
of the century. About the same rate of GDP level growth took place in the other 
Baltic countries. 
 
At  the  same  time  the  Nordic countries  –  a  traditional benchmark  region  for  the 
Baltic States – have demonstrated much slower speed of GDP growth - only 38% 
from the beginning of the period. On the whole, the rest of the EU countries have 
grown at even a slower pace than the Nordic region. 
 
However, in comparison with the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries’ GDP per 
capita level in absolute terms remains far lower. Despite some catching-up effect, 
the Baltic countries, GDP per capita is about one fourth of Nordic ones. To compare 
with the EU average level, Estonia progressed from 24% close to half of the EU 
income. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the Nordic countries advanced during the 
period more than did Estonia – correspondingly they gained 12.2 and 7.7 thousand 
euros per inhabitant. 
 
Baltic economic leveling with the EU average GDP level figures were based on high 
growth rates during 2000-2007 (Table 2). 
 
Estonia’s  growth  in  early  2000  indicates  recovery  from  the  setbacks  during  the 
Asian and Russian crisis at the end on 90-ies. However, the growth rate remained 
significantly  high  until  2007.  Also,  the  other  Baltic  countries‘ economic  growth 
rates until the crisis were extraordinary high in the European context, which brought 
into use the phrase “Baltic tigers”. As the table shows, in some years the Baltic’s 
growth reached more than 10 percent. The European and Nordic countries’ average 
growth rates remained in the range of 1 to less than 4 percent until 2008. The growth 
rate in Estonia was from 2 to 4 times higher than in the Nordic countries during 
2000-2007.  In  comparison  with  EU  averages,  the  difference  is  even  bigger. 
Unfortunately, the GDP growth turned negative in 2008.    264 
Table 2. Real GDP growth rate, % 
 
Average 
2000-
2003 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Estonia  8.3  7.2  9.4  10.6  6.9  -5.1  -13.9  3.1 
Latvia  7.2  8.7  10.6  12.2  10.0  -4.2  -18.0  -0.3 
Lithuania  6.8  7.4  7.8  7.8  9.8  2.9  -14.7  1.3 
Nordic   2.2  3.6  2.8  3.6  3.2  -0.03  -5.1  2.8 
EU (27)  2.1  2.5  2.0  3.2  3.0  0.5  -4.2  1.8 
Estonia 
compared to the 
Nordic average*  
3.8  2.0  3.4  2.9  2.1  -  -2.7  1.1 
Estonia 
compared to the 
EU* 
3.9  2.9  4.7  3.3  2.3  -10.2  3.3  1.7 
* Estonian figures are divided by correlative figures. 
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Economy and Finance; National 
Accounts) and author’s calculations. 
 
The fast GDP growth correlates directly with the strong labor market characteristics 
(Table 3). Employment in Estonia grew from 573 thousand persons at the beginning 
of century up to 657 thousand employed persons in 2008. 
 
Table 3. Labor market characteristics, age group 15-74 (thousands), ratios and 
average salary, 2000-2010 
  Average 
2000-
2003 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Employed  582.5  595.5  607.4  646.3  655.3  656.5  595.8  570.9 
Unemployed  76.6  63.6  52.2  40.5  32.0  38.4  95.1  115.9 
Inactive  388.0  388.7  389.0  362.3  359.0  347.9  348.0  348.0 
Employment  
rate, %    55.6  56.8  57.9  61.6  62.6  63.0  57.4  55.2 
Un-
employment 
rate, % 
11.6%  9.7%  7.9%  5.9%  4.7%  5.5%  13.8%  16.9% 
Average 
salary, EUR  < 400  443  502  582  705  806  771  767 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia (Section: Subject area: Social life; sub-section 
Labor Market) and author’s calculations.   265 
On the peak of the economic cycle, the unemployment rate declined down to 4.7%, 
which  is  perhaps  lower  than  natural  rate  of  unemployment.  Participation  rate 
increased significantly. In 2008, average work salary doubled if compared with the 
beginning of the period.  
 
To summarize the section, during the period 2000-2007, Estonia and the other Baltic 
countries demonstrated unique growth rates in the EU context and enjoyed a very 
strong labor market situation. Unfortunately, such high growth wasn’t sustainable. 
Even worse, the economies went into severe decline in 2008-2009. 
 
3. Factors behind the growth 
 
What were the main driving forces behind the exceptionally high growth rates? In 
general, the growth was based on a mix of various (coincident) components. Among 
several,  the  author  emphasizes  three  of  most  important  –the  impact  of  the  EU 
enlargement effect on the Estonian economy; strong domestic demand and the pro-
cyclical nature of macroeconomic policies. On a large scale, the Estonian situation 
was similar to the Latvian and Lithuanian economies during the named period. 
 
3.1. The EU enlargement effect 
 
One  of  the  essentials  of  fast  economic  growth  was  related  to  the  so  called  EU 
“enlargement effect”
1. This is a broad term, which characterizes the positive impact 
of EU membership on new members of the economic and customs union. In general, 
the foundations of the EU enlargement effect can be considered as market impact 
and regulatory impact. The outstanding image and reputation of the EU economic, 
technological and social standards become automatically attributable to the all union 
members. In the course of EU accession, Estonia adopted acquis communautaire.  
 
The Estonian economy integrated during the decade with European economic space 
and  thus  obtained  easy  access  to  very  large-scale  and  high  purchasing-power 
markets. The EU enlargement effects can be summarized as intensifying trade and 
investment  activities  and  strengthening  Estonia’s  economic  environment.  Joining 
Estonia to the EU in 2004 was followed by the strengthening of the country’s global 
competitiveness and export capacity. 
 
Most  visibly  the  positive  effect  is  noticeable  in  trade  and  investment  flows. 
European markets provided new business opportunities for Estonian companies and 
Estonia  became  more  attractive  for  international  businesses,  especially  as  a 
destination for foreign investments. Table 4 presents flows of FDI (foreign direct 
investment) during the decade. 
 
                                                                  
1 Compact overview of the “enlargement effect” is given by Purfield and Rosenberg (2010)    266 
Table 4. Direct investment in Estonia (FDI) 
  Million euros  Percent of total 
 
FDI  Equity 
capital 
Re-
invested 
earnings 
Other direct 
investment 
capital 
Equity 
capital  
Re-
invested 
earnings 
Other direct 
investment 
capital 
2000  425  251  116  58  59.1%  27.3%  13.6% 
2003  822  341  410  72  41.4%  49.8%  8.8% 
2004  771  297  510  -36  38.5%  66.2%  -4.6% 
2005  2,307  1,788*  568  -49  77.5%  24.6%  -2.1% 
2006  1,432  143  1,000  288  10.0%  69.9%  20.1% 
2007  1,985  273  1,367  345  13.8%  68.9%  17.4% 
2008  1,182  195  871  116  16.5%  73.7%  9.8% 
2009  1,323  1,219**  407  -303  92.2%  30.8%  -22.9% 
2010  1,162  349  928  -115  30.0%  79.9%  -9.9% 
* Includes Hansabank minority shares takeover by the parent Swedbank. 
** Includes Estonian Telecom (public company) shares selling to TeliaSonera. 
Source: Bank of Estonia Homepage (Section - International investment position) and 
author’s calculation. 
 
There is an observable clear trend of investment increase during 2003-2007. In the 
middle of the decade the annual inflow of FDI increased 5 times compared with the 
beginning of the century. Particularly, Nordic banking corporations obtained strong 
positions on Estonia’s financial markets. Also significant investments went into the 
manufacturing,  retailing  and  logistics  sectors.  The  Estonian  legal  and  economic 
environment is transparent and predictable for foreign businesses. As a result, the 
Baltic  countries  became  more  closely  integrated  with  of  Nordic  economic 
environment. 
 
However, the FDI structure by the form of investments is somewhat warped. There 
has been a rather high share of reinvested earnings, which in most of the years cover 
more than two thirds of all incoming FDI
2. 
 
Such a situation is clearly related to Estonian tax system features, which favor s 
reinvested earnings before other forms of investments
3. Another aspect of FDI is 
related  to  its  sectoral  allocation.  Some  researchers  emphasize,  that  too  many 
investments  have  been  allocated  to  financial  and  low  tech  sectors  (Zhan  and 
Sulstarova 2011). Those investments are focused on domestic consumers and not 
able to generate export flows or high technology products. 
 
                                                                  
2 In 2005 high equity capital inflow was related with takeover of Hansapank minority shares 
and 2009 selling of Estonian telecom shares to TeliaSonera corporation. 
3 As profits tax applies only for dividend payout, therefore companies are not motivated to 
distribute profits.   267 
To conclude this section – the EU enlargement effect can be highlighted as the most 
important aspect of Estonia’s significant growth record. However, EU enlargement 
was a once-in-a- lifetime factor and it accelerated economic growth only during the 
short term. 
 
3.2. Domestic demand as a growth engine 
   
Table  5  presents  the  components  of  GDP  and  their  impact  on  general  growth. 
Private  consumption  is  usually  the  biggest  part  of  GDP  and  therefore  mainly 
determines gross product dynamics. Private investment’s contribution to growth has 
been volatile, but mostly it has changed hand in hand with consumption dynamics. 
Public expenditure was rather a minor supporter of growth during the boom years 
and its contribution remained less than 1% of total demand most of the years. Net 
export, differently from the other GDP components, was negative during 2000-2007. 
During the boom years demand for imports significantly exceeded export capacity. 
 
Table 5. Estonian GDP components (in millions of euros) and their contribution to 
GDP growth (in brackets, percent) and balance of payment (PoB) indicators (percent 
of GDP) 
 
Average 
2000-
2003 
2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Real GDP 
growth, %  8.3  7.2  9.4  10.6  6.9  -5.1  -13.9  3.1 
Private 
consumption 
4,054 
(4.5) 
5,329 
(4.5) 
6,070 
(5.3) 
7,254 
(7.3) 
8,517 
(4.7) 
8,657 
(-3.4) 
7,201 
(- 8.5) 
7,235 
(-0.9) 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
2,123 
(4.7) 
2,991 
(1.9) 
3,589 
(4.7) 
4,819 
(7.4) 
5,713 
(4.0) 
4,849 
(-5.4) 
2,969 
(-11.3) 
2,694 
(-1.9) 
General 
government 
final 
consumption 
1,389 
(0.5) 
1,709 
(0.2) 
1,923 
(0.6) 
2,169 
(0.9) 
2,643 
(1.1) 
3,131 
(0.8) 
3,046 
(-0.3) 
2,991 
(-0.2) 
Net export  -405 
(- 3.3) 
-683 
(- 1.2) 
-727 
(- 1.5) 
-1,372 
(- 7.0) 
-1,483 
(- 2.6) 
-697 
(5.3) 
807 
(11.1) 
983 
(2.5) 
BoP: Current 
account  -8.1%  -11.3%  -10.0%  -15.3%  -17.2%  -9.7%  4.5%  3.6% 
BoP: 
Financial 
account 
9.0%  14.2%  11.0%  17.9%  15.7%  11.0%  -6.6%  -12.2% 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia (Subject area: Economy; National Accounts); 
BoP statistics from Bank of Estonia (Section Balance of Payments) and author’s 
calculations. 
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As is evident in Table 5, the Estonian economic boom and overheating during 2004-
2007  was  generated  by  domestic  demand  factors  -  private  consumption  and 
investments. Perhaps for the first time in the history of Estonia (true also for the 
other Baltic countries), the society was able to increase its individual consumption 
level and general welfare with such high speed. 
 
However,  during  the  2008-2009  crisis  years,  investment  demand  declined 
immediately. Private investments in 2009 was only about half of what it had been in 
2007. Usually public sector expenditure increases during recessions and government 
spending compensates, in part, for private sector contraction. However, in Estonia 
the  private  sector  decline  was  far  larger  than  the  expansion  of  public  sector 
spending.  
 
The Table also shows how domestic consumption correlates with the Balance of 
Payments.  During  the  boom  years, the  Current  Account  was  deeply  negative  – 
mainly due to a negative trade balance. The net import flows were financed by the 
incoming  financial  resources  and  investments  nicely  demonstrating  financial 
account dynamics. 
 
Fast economic growth in the boom years was supported not only by strong labor 
markets  but  also  by  fast  growing  incomes,  which  were  further  leveraged  by 
borrowed funds. Table 6 provides an overview of the stock of Estonian loans over 
the  90s,  mostly  by  foreign  owned,  commercial  banks.  The  amount  of  loans 
outstanding increased from 2001 to 2008 more than 7 times and reached close to 
90% of GDP! The household loan burden, which was very limited even a decade 
ago, increased to about 40% of the total outstanding debt at the end of the boom 
years.  
 
Table 6. Stock of loans, billion euro 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
TOTAL  1.8  2.5  3.4  4.3  5.7   8.3  11.4  13.3  13.0  12.7 
% of GDP  26%  32%  39%  44%  51%  62%  71%  82%  94%  89% 
General 
government  0.1   0.1   0.2   0.1   0.1   0.1   0.2   0.3   0.4   0.4  
Non-fin. 
corporations  0.8   0.9   1.1   1.4   2.3   3.7   5.1   6.1   6.0   5.8  
Households  0.4   0.6   0.8   1.2   2.4   4.0   5.3   6.3   6.2   6.2  
% of GDP  6%  8%  9%  12%  21%  30%  33%  38%  45%  43% 
% of total   21%  24%  24%  28%  41%  48%  47%  47%  48%  48% 
Source: Bank of Estonia Homepage (Section: Financial Sector Statistics). 
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The loans went primarily to the private sector; the public borrowing remained rather 
minor. The accessibility of loans was made easy - banks aggressively competed for 
customers. Easy access to credits increased nominal purchasing power. The debt was 
primarily channeled to housing-construction; retailing and related activities. As was 
mentioned  earlier  -  there  were  “natural”  reasons  behind  the  high  consumption 
activity.  
 
Also, dating from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the turn of century - the 
construction of residential housing had practically stopped. The depreciation of the 
existing housing stock and dissatisfaction with Soviet-style housing generated a real 
need for housing modernization and for an expanding construction sector and its 
related activities. However, the construction sector clearly expanded too fast and 
generated a “housing bubble”. This market bubble is also characterized by price 
increases in housing (Table 10), in certain years, the fastest in the EU.  
 
To  summarize  this  section  –  the  Estonian  economic  boom  was  generated  by 
domestic consumption and investments, which were fueled (and financed by rapidly 
increasing incomes; easy indebtedness and foreign direct investments.  
  
4. Outcomes of overheating  
 
Estonian macroeconomic data demonstrates extremely fast growth of the economy 
during  2000-2007.  However,  the  rapid  growth  period  was  followed  by  a  sharp 
downturn. Estonian economic growth wasn’t sustainable and recession corrected the 
accumulated imbalances.  
  
Economic overheating generated various macroeconomic setbacks in the economy. 
The biggest of them are - negative changes in the structure of economic activities; 
limited  motivation  for  productivity  growth  and  a  decline  in  Estonia’s  global 
competitiveness. 
 
The  speedily  expanding  domestic  market  absorbed  most  business  activities 
products-services and companies had that much less motivation to expand to foreign 
markets. Therefore, the economic structure and labor allocation moved to domestic 
consumption and services. As Table 7 presents, employment increased significantly 
during the boom years.  
 
The largest employment gains in the growth years were in the construction sector, 
retailing and accommodation-food service. Such a trend indicates a labor force shift 
to domestic consumption-oriented activities. During the crisis years those industries 
lost their employment at about the same rate. But agriculture was the biggest looser 
of employment, which mainly indicates a general structural changes in economy. 
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Table 7. Estonian employment structure*, thousands 
 
Average 
2000- 
2004 
(1) 
Average 
2005-
2008 
(2) 
2009 
2010 
 
(3) 
Diffe- 
rence  
(2)-(1) 
Diffe-
rence  
(3)-(2) 
Economic activities 
total  585.1  641.4  595.8  570.9  56.3  -70.5 
Construction  42.3  68.9  58.3  47.9  26.6  -21.0 
Wholesale and 
 retail trade  80.6  86.9  83.2  80.0  6.3  -6.9 
Accommodation  
and food   17.9  22.2  20.1  19.4  4.3  -2.8 
Manufacturing  130.4  133.7  113.8  108.4  3.3  -25.3 
Arts and recreation  15.0  16.5  14.2  14.7  1.4  -1.8 
Real estate activities  11.4  10.0  9.2  10.1  -1.4  0.1 
Agriculture and forestry  38.5  29.5  24.0  24.1  -9.0  -5.4 
* Employment by industries is ranked - by most gained professions to the lowest and indicated 
first three and least three. In the middle is given “manufacturing” as the biggest sector of 
employment. 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia Homepage (Subject area: Social life; sub-
section Labor Market) and author’s calculations. 
 
 During the boom years, employment growth in the biggest employment sector – 
manufacturing - was rather moderate. The allocation of labor resources to the sectors 
which mainly satisfy domestic demand for consumption and services, i.e. allocation 
to low-tech industries, slowed down production modernization. At the same time, 
high domestic demand and low employment pushed up nominal wages. Table 8 
presents’ the behavior of unit labor costs and labor productivity in various countries.  
 
Table 8. Unit labor cost (2005=100%) and labor productivity (in brackets, rounded, 
compared to EU (27) 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Estonia  101 
(41) 
100 
(43) 
101 
(46) 
102 
(49) 
100 
(52) 
105 
(56) 
114 
(56) 
117 
(59) 
109 
(61) 
Nordic  102 
(126) 
103 
(124) 
103 
(125) 
101 
(129) 
98 
(132) 
100 
(130) 
101 
(132) 
107 
(126) 
104 
(130) 
EU(27)  102  102  102  100  98  97  98  101  100 
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Annual 
National Accounts; Unit Labor cost) and author’s calculations).  
 
Unit labor costs in Estonia increased rapidly during the period. At the same time, 
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with  EU  average  productivity  levels,  production  efficiency  remains  low  in 
comparison  to  the  EU  average  figures.  At  the  same  time,  the  Nordic  countries’ 
average labor productivity is about one third higher than the EU average.  
 
We begin to see meaning in the assertion, that domestic consumption grew “too 
fast”, in that such growth slowed down Estonia’s  microeconomic upgrading and 
deformed companies’ export motives (State of Region Reports, 2010 p.2). All that 
weakened the Estonian global competitiveness position. As presented in Table 9, 
after 2005 Estonia’ competitive position started to deteriorate and the country fell 15 
places  in  the  world  competitiveness  ranking.  There  is  a  paradoxical  situation  – 
during the fast economic growth, Estonia’s global competitiveness actually fell.  
Similarly, the other Baltic countries lost their competitiveness positions. At the same 
time,  the  Nordic  countries  and  Germany,  already  highly  ranked  in  global 
competitiveness maintained their favorable positions.  
 
Table 9. Global competitiveness ranking 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Germany  13  15  8  5  7  7  5 
Sweden  3  3  3  4  4  4  2 
Finland  1  1  2  6  6  6  7 
Estonia  20  20  25  27  32  35  33 
Lithuania  36  43  40  38  44  53  47 
Latvia  44  44  36  45  54  68  70 
Source: World Economic Forum Homepage, (Section Reports; relevant years’ 
issues). 
 
To conclude the section, imbalanced economic growth deformed resource allocation 
and lessened motives for economic modernization. Therefore, despite the opening 
accesses to the EU markets, Estonian companies actually were not increasing their 
microeconomic competitiveness. 
 
5. Macroeconomic policies 
 
In the following pages will be generalized Estonian macroeconomic policy options 
for managing the business cycle. First will be considered aspects of monetary policy 
and  the  final  part  of  the  paper  are  dedicated  to  Estonian  government’s  fiscal 
activities during the different phases of the business cycle. 
 
5.1. Monetary policy 
 
Since  Estonia’s  currency  reform  in  1992,  the  country  has  been  is  using  a  fixed 
exchange rate system, i.e., its specific adaptation – the so called currency board 
system. In January 2011, Estonia joined the eurozone and became its 17
th member.   272 
Estonia is a small, open economy. That means that under fixed exchange rate regime 
conditions,  the  country’s  central  bank  has  rather  limited  impact  over  monetary 
policy instruments. The central bank cannot change the anchor exchange rate (e.g. 
against the euro); also, it has limited impact on interests rate levels (which are given 
by the global markets) and limited control over the credit supply. Since monetary 
policy tools are limited – effective inflation control is also narrowed. 
 
Because the basis for monetary expansion or contradiction moves along with the 
business cycle – monetary policy in Estonia under the currency board system has 
been always pro-cyclical. The central bank has rather limited tools to stop credit 
overhang or to expand the money supply during recessions. The Estonian Bank is 
limited to a persuasive and informative role in monetary policy.  
 
As demonstrated in Table 6, borrowing in Estonia increased significantly during the 
first  half  of  the  decade.  Such  a  fast  increase  of  credit  created  unbalances  and 
overheating consumption and investments. The significant inflow of cheap credits 
and high spending activity generated relatively high inflation (Table 10), which did 
not allow Estonia to join the eurozone in 2007 or 2008. 
 
Table 10. Annual average rate of change of consumer prices (HICPs); housing price 
index (in brackets, 2005=100) and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER); 
1999=100 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Estonia 
 
REER 
5.6 
(80) 
3.6 
(87) 
1.4 
(89) 
3.0 
(93) 
4.1 
(100) 
4.4 
(111) 
6.7 
(127) 
10.6 
(148) 
0.2 
(150) 
2.7 
(155) 
98   100   107   112   113   121   139   152   153   142 
Nordic 
 
REER 
2.6 
(87) 
1.8 
(90) 
1.9 
(95) 
0.7 
(97) 
1.2 
(100) 
1.8 
(105) 
1.4 
(106) 
3.6 
(112) 
1.7 
(115) 
2.0 
(120) 
98   101   104   104   105   106   110   114   113   114  
EU(27) 
 
 REER 
2.2 
(89) 
2.1 
(91) 
2.0 
(93) 
2.0 
(95) 
2.2 
(100) 
2.2 
(105) 
2.3 
(109) 
3.7 
(116) 
1.0 
(117) 
2.1 
(120) 
92   97   109   116   114   115   122   124   121   122  
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Exchange 
Rates) and (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Harmonized indices of 
consumer prices (HICP) and author’s calculations).  
 
Particularly  high  were  price  increases  in  the  construction,  housing  and  retailing 
sectors.  The  annual  HICP  was  1.5-3  times  higher  than  in  the  EU  average  and 
compared with the Nordic countries. While there are other instruments to control 
inflation - like fiscal constraints or direct price regulation, anti-inflationary measures 
were not effectively used in Estonia. 
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As domestic prices increased much faster in Estonia than in most EU countries, its 
real  effective  exchange  rate  significantly  depreciated.  Particularly  strong  was 
depreciation against currencies of its main export destination countries – Finland 
and  Sweden.  Therefore,  the  country  lost  significantly  its  competitive  position  in 
Nordic markets.  
 
To conclude this section, one may say – the Estonian monetary system functioned 
efficiently  to  maintain  exchange  rate  stability  and  therefore  provided  needed 
confidence to both domestic and foreign businesses. However, the currency board 
system is not an effective mechanism to shelter against outside economic shocks and 
for  fine  tuning  of  economic  processes.  Monetary  policy  was  incapable  of 
neutralizing credit overhang during the boom years and did not allow the use of 
“quantitative easing” schemes during the recession. But, once again, the monetary 
system in Estonia did its main duty – it maintained the sustainability of its currency 
system and avoided exchange rate devaluation. 
  
5.2. Fiscal policy 
 
As argued earlier, monetary policy under a currency board system is not an effective 
tool for macroeconomic management and controlling monetary flows in a small, 
open  economy.  In  such  a  case,  the  most  influential  instrument  for  managing  a 
business  cycle is  a  fiscal  policy  –  tax  policy  and  public  spending,  with  specific 
targeted fiscal measures. 
 
The Estonian approach to fiscal and tax policy has been over the decades somewhat 
simplistic. On the one hand, there is emphasized the “need” to maintain a budget 
surplus, a simple tax system and low public debt. On the other hand, fiscal policy in 
Estonia has been rather weakly used as an active tool for business cycle management 
and  as  an  economic  stabilization  mechanism.  The  county’s  mainstream 
understanding about government fiscal activities opposes the traditional Keynesian 
understanding,  where  one  the  main  goals  of  fiscal  policy  is  to  stabilize  GDP 
volatility. Estonian fiscal policy has ignored stabilization issues and instead, focused 
on narrow political objectives (e.g. tax rate decreases or budget balance). Therefore, 
over  the  decades  Estonian  fiscal  policy  has  been  rather  pro-cyclical  by  its 
characteristics (e.g IMF Annual Reports in various years). In addition, the scope and 
role of automatic stabilizers in the economy has also been rather limited.  
 
During  the  period  2001-2007,  Estonian  public  sector  expenditures  and  revenue 
percentages remained below Nordic and EU average levels and were rather stable 
(Table  11).  Estonia’s  revenue  level  during  the  pre-crises  period  was  about  20 
percentage points less than in the Nordic countries.  
 
Fast economic growth and a low public sector “maintenance cost” allowed both a 
low expenditure and revenue side of the public budget.    274 
Table 11. Total general government expenditure and government revenue (in 
brackets), % of GDP 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Estonia  34.8 
(34.7) 
35.8 
(36.0 
34.8 
(36.5) 
34.0 
(35.6) 
33.6 
(35.2 
33.6 
(36.1) 
34.0 
(36.4) 
39.5 
(36.5) 
45.2 
(43.2) 
40.6 
(40.9) 
Nordic  50.2 
(55.5) 
51.6 
(54.6) 
52.3 
(54.4) 
51.1 
(55.0) 
49.8 
(56.0) 
48.5 
(55.9) 
47.6 
(55.4) 
48.4 
(55.6) 
53.9 
(54.9) 
53.0 
(54.3) 
EU (27)  46.1 
(44.6) 
46.6 
(44.0) 
47.2 
(44.0) 
46.8 
(43.9) 
46.8 
(44.3) 
46.3 
(44.8) 
45.6 
(44.7) 
47.1 
(44.7) 
51.0 
(44.1) 
50.6 
(44.1) 
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Government 
Statistics; Annual Government finance statistics). 
 
During the crisis years 2008-2009, the situation in Estonia radically changed – first 
the  expenditure  and  then  revenue  ratios  increased  sharply.  It  must  be  noted, 
however, that the significant increase of expenditures and revenues, as a percentage 
of  GDP,  were  not  caused  by  their  increase  in  absolute  terms,  but  is  the  simple 
mathematical result of the severe contraction of the GDP. 
 
A  very  different  situation  is  visible  in  the  Nordic  countries,  where  only  the 
expenditure side increases in the recession and the revenue side – or tax burden- was 
kept stable. The Nordic countries supported economic stability through a stimulation 
package, which eventually increased the public spending level. 
 
Business cycle phases are also apparent in Estonia’s public deficit levels (Table 12). 
Estonia’s  usual  budget  surplus  turns  negative  during  the  crises  years.  Such  a 
situation is rather common  - fiscal deficits and debts are declining during boom 
years and increasing during recessions. However, the Nordic countries did, on the 
average, maintain budget surpluses even in case of global recession. 
 
Table 12. Budget deficit and general government consolidated gross debt (in 
brackets), % of GDP 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Estonia  -0.1 
(4.8) 
0.3 
(5.7) 
1.7 
(5.6) 
1.6 
(5.0) 
1.6 
(4.6) 
2.5 
(4.4) 
2.4 
(3.7) 
-2.9 
(4.5) 
-2.0 
(7.2) 
0.2 
(6.7) 
Nordic 
average 
5.4 
(44.0) 
3.1 
(44.9) 
2.3 
(46.9) 
4.1 
(46.4) 
6.3 
(43.6) 
7.5 
(43.0) 
7.8 
(38.6) 
7.2 
(39.1) 
1.2 
(42.7) 
1.4 
(43.9) 
EU (27) 
average 
-1.5 
(61.0) 
-2.6 
(60.4) 
-3.2 
(61.9) 
-2.9 
(62.3) 
-2.4 
(62.8) 
-1.5 
(61.5) 
-0.9 
(59.0) 
-2.4 
(62.5) 
-6.9 
(74.7) 
-6.6 
(80.1) 
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Government 
Statistics; Annual Government finance statistics) and author’s calculations.   275 
The Table 12 also demonstrates a unique feature of the Estonian fiscal situation – 
the extremely low level of the public debt - while in the other EU countries public 
debt reached far over Maastricht criteria levels. 
 
5.3. Taxes and the business cycle 
 
There is a clear impact of tax policy on economic developments in various phases of 
the business cycle. The key terms of Estonian tax policy have been “flat tax”, “no 
tax on reinvested profits” and “shifting tax burden to consumption”. As an outcome, 
the country’s tax policy impact on the economic cycle has been clearly pro-cyclical. 
Such  a  tax  system  increases  government  sector  dependency  on  consumption, 
narrows the tax base and limits the scope of automatic stabilizers. The profits tax 
from reinvested earnings was abolished in 2000. This significantly decreased the tax 
burden  on  businesses.  The  author’s  argument  here  is  that  the  pro-cyclical  tax 
environment was one of major reasons that led Estonia to economic overheating and 
afterwards – record-deep recession.  
 
In  the  course  of  EU  enlargement,  Estonia  had  to  satisfy  the  indirect  tax 
harmonization requirements of the union, which in practice meant establishing some 
new  indirect  taxes,  increasing  the  VAT  and  excise  duties  at  least  to  the  EU’s 
required  minimal  levels.  All  that,  in  combination  with  the  expanding  social 
expenditures, dragged the tax burden up somewhat. However, the country’s pre-
crisis tax burden remained far below its Nordic neighbors (Table 13). 
  
Table 13. Tax burden compared with GDP, per cent 
   Estonia  Nordic  EU (27) 
   2001  2008  2009  2001  2008  2009  2001  2008  2009 
Total taxes 
(including SSC)  30.3  31.5  35.5  46.5  45.0  45.2  40.2  40.1  39.4 
Taxes on 
income and 
wealth 
7.2  7.8  7.6  22.3  22.2  21.5  13.4  13.3  12.4 
Taxes on 
production  12.3  11.9  14.7  14.9  14.7  15.3  12.9  12.7  12.6 
Social security 
contributions  10.7  11.6  13.1  8.9  7.7  8.1  12.8  12.7  13.1 
Source: Eurostat Homepage (Section: Statistics; Economy and Finance; Government 
Statistics; Annual Government finance statistics). 
 
The pro-cyclical nature of the Estonian tax system grounds in two facts – the high 
dependency  on  consumption  taxes and  the  limited  scope  of  tax  based  automatic 
stabilizers. Any sharp decline in consumption, as happened during the last recession, 
puts the public sector budgets at risk. While the burden of consumption taxes in 
Estonia compared with the GDP is in about the same average range as in the Nordic 
countries and the EU, Estonia has the highest proportion of consumption taxes to 
total taxes in the EU.    276 
The most striking difference in the tax structure between Estonia and the Nordic 
countries comes in income (both personal and business) and wealth taxation. The 
Estonian public sector collects only about 1/3d of the revenue of its Nordic peers. 
During the boom years, Estonia continued decreasing direct personal income (as 
well as profit) tax rates- from 26% down to 21%. The tax rate cuts were purely 
politically  driven  and  were  implemented  in  extremely  favorable  economic 
conditions. The lower income tax rates lowered private sector budget constraints and 
increased  its  nominal  purchasing  power.  As  a  result,  the  increase  of  purchasing 
power  in  turn  fueled  private  consumption  and  investments  and  the  economy’s 
overheating. Lower tax rates made the tax schedule less progressive and in turn, the 
scope of automatic stabilizers was further limited. However, the negative outcomes 
of such tax structure changes were widely ignored; even the Central Bank never paid 
attention to such a pro-cyclical tax policies. 
 
6. Crises management 
 
The impact of the global crisis in 2008 on the Estonian economy and society was 
fast, unexpected and devastating. The country was already on the road to economic 
recession and the worldwide crises multiplied the scope of the downturn. 
 
As emphasized earlier, Estonian economic misbalance and overheating inevitably 
led to a certain natural need for correction. From the second half of the 2008, clear 
signs of  an  economic slowdown  were  present.  However,  the  government  clearly 
underestimated the recession risks and warning signals. The adopted State budget 
for 2009 expected only somewhat lower economic growth and moderate increases of 
unemployment  compared  with  the  earlier  years  (Estonian  Ministry  of  Finance 
Homepage; State Budget 2009). The society’s expectations were, that the economy 
would slow down to a “soft landing”  
 
However, just “overnight” were reached high levels of unemployment and economic 
decline unseen over the last decade in Estonia. The economic downturn from the 
second half of 2008 led the public budget speedily into the negative side. 
 
How did the Estonian government respond to the crises? Were the actions adequate?  
 
There is no one short answer. Actually the crises can be separated into two episodes 
- the first episode is the fast economic decline during the period, 2008-2010, and the 
second, stabilization and recovery during 2010-2011. Perhaps it is too early to say 
that the crisis is over; therefore this article will consider the last years as a part of the 
recession period. 
 
During the first phase of the acute crisis Estonia did everything exactly the opposite 
of  what  standard  economic  theory  recommends.  There  are  efficient  measures 
applicable  during  a  recession  -  an  increase  in  government  consumption  and 
investment spending, a decrease of income, profit and consumption tax rates and an 
increase  of  transfers  to  financially  constrained  households  (American  Economic 
Journal, 2012).    277 
Instead, Estonia cut government spending and investments severely, increased labor 
and consumption taxes and did not increase transfer payments to the neediest part of 
the population. As, expected theoretically, the outcome was a fast decline in the 
economy and high unemployment. 
 
The government’s immediate reaction to the crisis was to cut budget expenditures. 
Further, the Parliament adopted several negative budgets during the 2008 and 2009 
(Ministry  of  Finance  Homepage;  State  Budget  relevant  years).  The  Estonian 
government even called itself the “world champion of business cuts”. 
 
Another measure to sustain “fiscal stability” was to increase consumption taxes and 
to  increase  the  VAT  rate  by  2  percentage  points  in  mid-2009.  As  predicted  by 
standard  economic theory  -  such  pro-cyclical  measures deepened  the  crisis  even 
more.  As  the  GDP  decreases,  the  relative  ratio  of  the  tax  burden  increases 
significantly. In 2010, Estonia’s relative increase of the tax burden was the highest 
in the European Union (Taxation Trends in EU, 2011, p.21).  
  
In the midst of deep crisis, the government decided in mid-2009 to join the eurozone 
as of January 2011. Fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria meant proceeding further 
with the austerity measures. Such steps limited the government’s room for maneuver 
in  growth  and  labor  market  stabilization.  In  comparison  with  many  other  EU 
countries, Estonia had “space” for more  active  measures to smooth the business 
cycle volatility (Economic Crisis in Europe, 2009). 
 
Estonia did not accept various stimulus packages which were used in most of the 
European Union countries (Szekely, 2011). Therefore, the author agrees with the 
opinion, that a narrow focus on Maastricht criteria strengthened the deepness of the 
crises (State of Region 2010, p. 2). 
 
The  question  arises  –  how  did  the  country  maintain  low  public  debt  during  the 
recession years and still attain economic growth without stimulus measures?  
 
As was emphasized, the country’s monetary policy measures are very limited in 
fixed exchange rate conditions. Even more, the fixed and stable exchange rate has 
been for decades one of Estonia’s economic policy cornerstones. Therefore even the 
hypothetical  possibility  of  the  devaluation  of  the  kroon  made  the  society  very 
nervous.  The  devaluation  option  wasn’t  politically  or  socially  possible.  For  that 
reason Estonia did not have the option to depreciate its currency as was done in the 
UK, Poland, Sweden and many other countries. 
 
Unlike  many  countries,  Estonia  did  not  opt  for  the  rather  common  stimulation 
measures through public borrowing and increasing public debt. The actual Estonia’s 
“stabilization  package”  was,  in  the  European  context,  as  unique  as  its  “growth 
package” had been a few years earlier. As emphasized above, in the boom years’ the 
public sector enjoyed extensive windfall revenues; a fraction of those revenues were 
channeled to a Stabilization fund. In the crisis year, those reserves were used to 
cover budget expenditure.   278 
However,  there  were  certain  other,  rather  exclusive,  sources  for  stabilizing 
government finances. Two of them should be emphasized here – the large-scale sale 
of  various  types  of  government  assets  and  intensive  use  of  EU  structural  funds 
donations. 
 
To stabilize the budget, the Estonian government speedily sold the majority shares 
of Estonian Telecom to the Finnish-Swedish communication company TeliaSonera. 
In addition public companies accumulated profits were intensively channeled to the 
use of the public sector.  
 
One  extraordinary  measure  was  the  sale  of  so  called  pollution  quotas  or  CO2 
emission rights quotas. Trade with those quotas generated a significant inflow of 
budget revenues.  
 
Additionally, government forced the exploitation of EU structural funds. During the 
EU financial perspective of 2007-2013, Estonia has the option to use more than 3.40 
billion euros (EU Structural Assistance). As most of those funds are distributed on a 
competitive  basis,  the  government  sector  was  forced  to  justify  various  “project 
money” from EU sources.  
 
Considering  these  extraordinary  budget  measures,  Estonia  was  able  to  maintain 
budget stability even during the deepest economic slowdown. However, the outcome 
of using such extraordinary revenues is deformation of the budget revenue structure. 
Namely, the state budget becomes largely dependent on non-tax revenues (Table 
14). 
 
Table 14. Estonian central government budget, million euros 
  2001  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Central 
government 
budget 
1,954  2,985  3,525  4,336  5,240  5,423  5,476  5,610 
Tax revenues  90.6%  84.0%  83.2%  81.4%  82.6%  82.9%  74.4%  72.1% 
Nontax 
revenues  9.4%  16.0%  16.8%  18.6%  17.4%  17.1%  26.0%  27.8% 
Source: Estonian Ministry of Finance Homepage (Section State Budget, relevant 
years) and author’s calculations. 
 
Non-tax revenues – assets sales and EU donations - were rather a minor part of 
budget  revenues  at  the  beginning  of  the  century.  During  the  crisis  years  those 
revenues  have  come  to  cover  about  one  third  of  the  entire  budget.  As  one  can 
recognize, those revenues exist only temporarily. The inflow of such revenues is 
going to sharply decline and must be replaced by regular tax revenues. 
 
To generalize – Estonia experienced one of the severest GDP declines in the global 
context and very high unemployment rates. However, Estonia did not use standard 
fiscal policy tools to stabilize its economy and to keep the labor market “alive”   279 
during the recession. The reasons behind the steps taken are the lack of experience 
and political choices.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The economic cycle in Estonia during the last decade has been very volatile. Such a 
high  amplitude  in  the  level  of  economic  activities  evidences  inadequate 
discretionary policies and weak automatic stabilizers in the economy. 
  
During the years, 2000-2007, Estonian economic growth was very high. The high 
rate of economic expansion was based on mix of various factors – the low initial 
economic level, the EU enlargement effect, the favorable global environment and 
economic  policies  supportive  of  expansion.  However,  during  the  period, 
macroeconomic  imbalances  accumulated  –  the  growth  was  based  on  domestic 
consumption and unrestrained credit expansion. Unproductive FDI led to inefficient 
resources  allocation.  Macroeconomic  policies  and  regulations  were  not  able 
(monetary  policy)  or  were  not  focused  (fiscal  policy)  to  curb  such  unbalanced 
economic expansion. To make matters worse, lowering income taxes and increasing 
public  spending  contributed  to  the  economy’s  overheating.  As  an  outcome,  the 
country’s  economy  lost  its  global  competitiveness  and  businesses  modernization 
was curtailed. As Estonia’s growth become unsustainable, certain macroeconomic 
corrections were predictable. 
 
However,  the  warning  signals  of  the  coming  recession  were  largely  ignored  by 
Estonian  government,  partly  because  of  inexperience  in  managing  an  economic 
cycle during crisis periods and partly for political reasons. 
 
During the first phase of the crisis, 2008-2009, government actions were just the 
opposite  of  measures  that  professional  economists  widely  consider  helpful  in 
stabilizing an economic slowdown. Radical cuts in state budgets and investment, 
and;  increasing  consumption  and  labor  taxes  deepened  the  crises  even  more. 
Eventually,  the  economic  decline  was  one  of  the  highest  in  the  EU  and 
unemployment reached almost 20%. The recession and unemployment was followed 
by the impoverishment of the population; accelerated emptying of remote regions 
and outmigration to foreign countries. 
 
During 2010-2011, more stabilization measures were used – faster and expanded use 
of EU structural funds, the sale of pollution quotas (half of total global trade in 
them!) and the channeling of those funds in the form of public investments to the 
economy.  Those  measures  allowed  stabilizing  public  finances  and  stimulating 
economic growth at the same time. However, those extra-revenues will drastically 
decline  during  the  coming  years.  The  Estonian  public  sector  should  be  able  to 
compensate declining subsidies through expanded collection of tax revenues. 
 
To conclude, the recent boom and severe recession provided a valuable lesson about 
unsuccessful business cycle management in Estonia. To secure sustainable growth in   280 
the future, economic policies should be focused on attaining a manageable business 
cycle, economic modernization and increased global competitiveness. 
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